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DO  NOT  CITE  OR  CIRCULATE  
Lee Anne Fennell† 
PEND A LITTLE TIME around legal academia and you will notice 
something strange.1 Law professors, who are generally quite 
enamored of their own words and not especially reluctant to 
toss around their own half-baked ideas, commonly attach 
some variant of this essay’s title (hereinafter “DNCC”) to early ver-
sions of their work products before sending them out into the world. 
Indeed, I have done it myself. But I have never seen the point of the 
practice, and the disadvantages are plain enough.2 Perhaps most 
puzzling is the prevalence of the DNCC label on papers publicly 
available on the internet.3 Surely this is a bit like closing the barn 
door after the horses are out. The paper can already be read by every 
man, woman, and child on the planet who has access to an internet 
connection. Where else could it possibly be circulated to? After con-
sidering possible rationales for the DNCC practice, I have concluded 
that we would all be better off if legal scholars would cut back  
significantly on the use of DNCC labels. This essay is devoted to 
convincing you of that proposition.  
                                                                                                 
† Lee Anne Fennell is the Max Pam Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. 
© 2015 Lee Anne Fennell. 
1 I do not mean to suggest that the practice I describe is unique to legal academia (it 
clearly isn’t), only that this is the place where I have encountered it. Nor do I mean 
to suggest that the practice I describe is the only strange thing about legal academia. 
2 Still, I will spell them out briefly in Part II, below. 
3 To get a sense of the magnitude of this phenomenon, try running a few searches in 
your favorite search engine. Instructions not to cite without permission even appear 
in the star notes of several published law review articles. 
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I.  WHY  DNCC?  
e can start by asking why anyone would ever slap a DNCC 
label on their work. Doing so is unnecessary to activate  
copyright protection and would seem to have little or no effect on the 
scope of those protections.4 The apparent goal is to make readers feel 
duty-bound to refrain from using the work in otherwise permissible 
ways. But why? I can think of a number of possibilities, but few of 
them hold much water. Those that do cannot account for the great 
majority of DNCC labeling that goes on.  
The Absent-Minded Friend. In this scenario, the writer believes that 
the document is not ready to be seen by anyone other than a particular 
trusted friend, spouse, colleague, or research assistant. Said friend or 
associate has been enlisted to help look for the most egregious and 
glaring of the errors contained therein. The nervous writer readies a 
cover email that explains the situation and prepares to attach the 
hideously unfinished document. She hesitates. What if the friend 
prints out or saves the document, forgets the reason he has it, and 
begins distributing it all over the place, causing it to get cited deri-
sively by hundreds of strangers who collectively bring the writer’s 
career to a cataclysmic halt? Better affix a DNCC label to the docu-
ment itself, just in case, before hitting “send.” This precaution, which 
will keep the absent-minded (but thoughtful and literate) friend from 
inadvertently misusing the document, seems like a valid, if slightly 
paranoid, use of the convention. However, most of the documents 
bearing the DNCC label, especially those freely available on the in-
ternet, were evidently not entrusted (just) to such a friend.5  
                                                                                                 
4 Copyright protections attach automatically and require no printed plea. Although a 
copyright notice is relevant to obtaining damages, DNCC is not a copyright notice. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 401. Rather, it seems to fall in the category of “restrictive legends.” 
See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 287-88 (2003). 
Whether such a legend could have any effect on the rights of users in this setting is 
questionable, but even if it did, we would still need an explanation for why an aca-
demic author would view that effect as desirable. See infra notes 10-13 and accom-
panying text (discussing potential interactions between copyright law and DNCC). 
5 Of course, the fact that there are many drafts circulating with the DNCC label in 
W 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2565446 
Do  Not  Cite  or  Circulate  
WINTER 2015   157  
The Misdirected Email. A variation on the point above, and on the 
disclaimers that are routinely appended to law firm email messages, 
is that the label affixed to the paper alerts any chance recipient to the 
fact that they received the document only by mistake, or as a result of 
misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of the person to whom it was 
initially conveyed. But this seems unlikely to explain much of the 
DNCCing we see. Very few law review articles are of much interest 
outside of the tiny enclave of people working in the same subject 
area. The odds of a random recipient caring enough to circulate or 
cite the piece seems vanishingly small.  
The Impending Presentation. A more likely explanation for DNCC 
labeling is that the writer signed up to give a paper at a workshop or 
conference that seemed blessedly far away at the time of commitment 
but is now bearing down on her like a freight train. The organizers 
are on her every minute of the day asking for the draft, and she has to 
give them something. She cobbles together a misshapen draft, adds a 
DNCC label, and sends it on, hoping for the best. While an impend-
ing presentation coupled with poor time management skills explains 
why someone might end up circulating shoddy work, it does not (on 
its own) explain what good the DNCC label is expected to do. This 
explanation, then, must be parasitic on one of the explanations that 
follow, such as “the reputational hedge.” 
The Reputational Hedge. It seems likely that some people put 
DNCC labels on their work in an effort to hedge their reputational 
bets. Their hope is that the paper will be very well-received. Their 
fear is that the paper will be viewed as utter garbage. They would like 
to have a way to indicate that the paper isn’t really done yet and that 
it will probably get a whole lot better in the future, so that they can 
limit the downside risk, without cutting into the upside potential. 
The question is whether the DNCC helps at all in this regard. I think 
                                                                                                 
semi-public fora and even on the internet does not establish that they were not 
initially conveyed to then-trusted friends in just the manner described above. 
Perhaps those “friends” didn’t bother to read the DNCC label before widely cir-
culating the draft, or actually circulated it on purpose against the writer’s wishes 
(after seeing how poorly crafted it was), in hopes of ending the writer’s career. 
This seems unlikely, however. 
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it does not. It is unrealistic to assume that bad impressions of work 
will be magically counteracted by a DNCC label. Few people will 
reread a paper after having read an early draft, and all one will really 
gain is an increased chance that the paper will be ignored.  
The Future Appointee. Some academics may have aspirations of a 
future political appointment to the bench or to some other lofty 
position. In the confirmation hearings that would surround such an 
event, the appointee might expect her political enemies to brandish 
snippets that put her intelligence, judgment, views, or grammatical 
skills in a poor light. But suppose that one or more such snippets 
come from a paper bearing a DNCC label. Is it plausible to suppose 
that the appointee’s enemies will hesitate to use it? And, if they do 
use it, is it plausible to suppose that the appointee will be able to 
effectively use the DNCC label as a shield?  
The Edgy Empiricist. I do not do empirical work, so this one is 
pure speculation. I understand that data arrive raw and have to be 
“cleaned” or even “scrubbed.” Regressions and robustness checks are 
run. This all takes time, and because small changes in methodology 
can make large differences in results, the careful empiricist might 
affix a DNCC warning to unfinished drafts lest anyone rely to their 
detriment on results that are tentative and in need of further checks 
or manipulations. This seems reasonable, at least if one posits some 
reason why the early-stage paper needs to be out there in the first 
place (see, e.g., “the impending presentation” supra).  
The Cautious Coauthor. Sometimes coauthors are in different places 
and on different schedules, communicating scattershot by email and 
phone, as a deadline approaches that requires putting the paper into 
the hands of others. Editing progresses, redlining begets bluelining, 
purplelining, and greenlining, and finally, the time is at hand – the 
paper must be turned in. If not all coauthors have had a reasonable 
opportunity to review all of the changes, the submitting coauthor 
might add a DNCC label to the paper as a kind of disclaimer. Sure, a 
coauthor could write something more forthright, like “Last Edited 
by Jones. Don’t Blame Smith!” or “Warning! This Draft Contains 
Edits Smith Never Even Saw” but that might puncture the illusion 
that the coauthors are a team working deliberatively and coopera-
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tively toward a unified goal, rather than a loosely allied band of pro-
crastinators.  
The Updater. With few exceptions, everyone who uses the 
DNCC formulation plans to update the draft at some point. Sure, 
some papers fall by the wayside, but strong pressures toward 
squeezing publication lemonade out of even the most lemon-like of 
drafts make paper abandonment a less common phenomenon than 
one might expect. Thus, one function of the DNCC formulation 
might be to induce the reader to find, and cite, a later draft or even 
the published version of the piece, if one exists. The idea is that the 
reader will say to herself, “Gee, it says not to cite it, but I really want 
to. I wonder if there’s a version somewhere that doesn’t say that.” If 
pursued, this line of reasoning might put the reader on the trail of 
the author’s finished masterpiece. But will the trail be followed, and, 
if so, is the DNCC notice the reason?  
I am skeptical on both counts. Unless the paper’s contribution is 
truly essential to the researcher’s project, the DNCC may cause the 
paper to get set aside or passed over in the rough and tumble of 
drafting. If the paper is really important enough to cite, however, 
most researchers would carefully look into whether there is a later 
draft or publication that would represent a more authoritative cite – 
even without the goad of the DNCC. If due diligence can’t turn up a 
later version when the researcher’s own work is being readied for 
the world, the DNCC presents a problem – the researcher may feel 
forced to leave out the cite, raising the risk that the cite won’t make 
it back in. Without a DNCC notice, the researcher can insert a cite 
to the working paper into her draft as a placeholder until such time 
as a more authoritative version comes into being.  
The Demanding Publisher. Closely related to the explanation above 
is the possibility that some publishers might insist on DNCC notices 
or refuse to consider submissions that have been previously distrib-
uted without such a notice attached. The student-edited law reviews 
in which many DNCCing legal scholars routinely publish have never, 
in my experience, expressed a DNCC preference. But even if some 
publishers and journals had such a requirement, it would merely 
push the puzzle back an additional level. If the publisher’s concern is 
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with readers accessing content without purchasing a book or a sub-
scription, then it seems as if the prohibition should be on posting or 
circulating work in the first place; adding a requirement of a DNCC 
notice clearly does nothing on its own to keep the content off the 
internet, for example. If, instead, the concern is with garnering 
proper citations to the published versions, it again seems questionable 
that a DNCC notice would produce a net increase in proper citations, 
rather than merely throw researchers off the trail.  
The Untimely Death. Could the DNCC notice instead represent an 
author’s attempt to arrange an advance communication from be-
yond the grave in the event of her sudden demise? If the author 
were to perish en route to a conference with the paper itself in tow, 
for example, first responders on the scene would know not to cite 
or circulate the draft. Perhaps more relevantly, the notice might 
provide some information to the decedent’s family and colleagues 
about how to treat the work. Yet given that even express requests 
to destroy works have been famously disregarded,6 it seems unlikely 
that the DNCC would carry very much weight. Those truly con-
cerned with how their work will be treated posthumously would do 
better to make more comprehensive arrangements, as the DNCC 
isn’t really up to testamentary work.  
The Neophyte Networker. Although I have primarily focused on the 
prohibitions contained in DNCC labels, they usually contain a kind 
of backhanded invitation as well: the stated bans can be dissolved by 
obtaining the author’s permission. Some legal scholars new to aca-
demia might view a DNCC notice as a networking opportunity. 
Instead of waiting around to meet people in your field, they might 
reason, just post compelling articles on the internet with DNCC 
labels, and let the luminaries come to you. Perhaps, along with a 
plenitude of requests for citation permission, you will receive tips 
on how to improve the article, adulation, friendship, conference 
invitations – maybe even offers to visit or interview at other schools. 
                                                                                                 
6 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 830-35 (2005) 
(describing and analyzing Kafka’s request to have his work destroyed upon his 
death, which his executor ignored). 
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While anything is possible, it seems safe to assume that if you would 
have been ignored absent the DNCC label, you will be ignored with 
equal or greater force after adding it, other things being equal. A 
better bet is to send out your article to people in your area for feed-
back. Some will ignore you, but surprisingly many will not.  
II.  THE  PRICE  
NCC labels are not costless. In thinking about the price they 
exact, it is helpful to address the prohibitions on citing and 
quoting separately from those on circulation. In thinking about 
whether the DNCC imposes any marginal burden, it is also useful to 
consider copyright law and fair use.  
No Citing, No Quoting. As online access makes early drafts more 
and more accessible, the fraction of citations to works in progress 
can be expected to increase. If everyone puts a DNCC note on every 
draft, the costs of producing a new draft will rise accordingly, if 
permission must be sought for each use.7 Academics are producing 
new drafts all the time, so the costs are borne by all of us. This 
would be a tragedy of the commons if each of us were actually in-
ternalizing some benefit from DNCCing that made it individually 
rational, if collectively foolish, to engage in the practice. But my 
sense is that, except in some limited cases, it is individually foolish as 
well. The DNCC provides scholars very little protective cover, while 
introducing an impediment between ideas and those who would use 
them. Most of us need all the publicity we can get for our work, and 
the DNCC works at cross-purposes with that goal. This is made 
painfully obvious when a blogger drawing attention to a draft feels 
forced to limit what can be said about it due to a DNCC notice.8  
 
                                                                                                 
7 This mirrors “anticommons” arguments raised in other contexts. See, e.g., MICHAEL 
A. HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY (2008). 
8 See, e.g., Larry Solum, lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2009/06/shaman-on-
originalism.html (explaining, after providing the abstract of an article recently 
posted on the Social Science Research Network, “I would like to have included 
some excerpts, but this paper has a do not quote or cite request.”). 
D 
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Not only does the audience miss a chance at a potentially relevant 
and interesting idea, the author is deprived of free publicity.9  
No Circulating. Academics may hesitate to share DNCC-marked 
drafts that they have in their possession with their colleagues who are 
working on similar issues, to the detriment of both the draft author 
and the potential sharees. Sure, it’s possible to contact the author 
and ask permission to share the work, but that’s a pain. Why should 
academics want to make it harder for others to do them favors?  
What About Copyright? In assessing the cost of DNCC, it is im-
portant to know whether it purports to restrict readers from engag-
ing in conduct that would otherwise be permissible. Could it be that 
the DNCC notice merely reiterates the copyright protections that 
already sheathe these nascent works, effectively performing a public 
service by warning academics against accidentally turning them-
selves into infringers? Copyright protects expression, not ideas,10 so 
merely citing a work and referring to its thesis or arguments (without 
quoting or closely paraphrasing) would not implicate copyright law. 
Quoting and copying unpublished work does fall within the domain 
of copyright, but the fair use defense remains available.11 To the 
extent that ordinary academic quoting and sharing count as fair use, 
the DNCC notice looks like an attempt to narrow the fair use privi-
                                                                                                 
9 Although citations and quotations are not invariably flattering to the author, they 
are usually good news. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of 
Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 381, 387 (2000) (“Negligible work is 
more likely to be ignored than to be cited. A negative citation often indicates that 
a work has gotten under the skin of the critic, perhaps because it mounts a power-
ful challenge to established positions or ways of thinking.”). 
10 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
11 Fair use is determined under a four-factor test, and one of the factors is “the nature 
of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. The fact that work is unpublished can 
enhance the protection it receives. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 
U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (“the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works” given “the author’s right to control the first public appearance of his ex-
pression”). But Congress has subsequently made clear that the fair use defense 
remains potentially available even for unpublished works. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”). 
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lege for work that the author has (in many cases) already made avail-
able to the entire world. Even if the label could play some role in 
copyright analysis, whether by removing an argument that an implied 
license had been granted,12 or by providing evidence about the nature 
of the work that might be pertinent to the fair use determination,13 
this still does not explain why an author should view such an effect as 
serving her interests.  
There remains the question of whether merely removing the 
DNCC label goes far enough to address the costs noted here. If some 
routine academic uses of some manuscripts would exceed fair use, 
then DNCC is not the (only) problem. Here, we might build on the 
Creative Commons model to add an “Academic Circulation Encour-
aged” (“ACE”) label to the lexicon of draft writers – assuming we 
could come up with a coherent idea of what academic circulation 
entails. In the meantime, academics should avoid hobbling each other 
beyond the legal scope of copyright protection by refraining from 
unnecessary DNCC labels.  
III.  THE  FIX  
he DNCC has an appealingly risk-averse quality that seems to 
exude a high degree of care, and it is easy to understand why 
academics, myself included, have fallen into using it. Perhaps, for 
those of us who practiced before teaching, it is a throwback to our 
days at the law firm, when caution reigned.14 Even then, I recall one 
                                                                                                 
12 The law surrounding implied licenses is highly murky, making it difficult to 
provide any definitive pronouncements here. See, e.g., Christopher Newman, 
“What Exactly Are You Implying?”: The Elusive Nature of the Implied Copyright License, 
32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501 (2014). 
13 For example, the DNCC might be evidentiary on a question that at least one 
commentator has deemed important to a fair use claim: “whether, at the time the 
putative infringement occurred, the creator considered her work finished.” William 
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1780 
(1988) (proposing that the fair use defense be unavailable where unfinished works 
are involved). But even if courts were to adopt this approach, labels like “prelimi-
nary and incomplete” or “draft” would work just as well. 
14 That inexplicable DNCC-like practices are not limited to academia is illustrated 
by the EPA’s use of the phrase “do not quote or cite” on freely available public 
T 
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administrative assistant making fun of our obsessive practice of 
stamping DRAFT on every copy of a brief that was in progress. 
“What, you think we’re going to just run off to the courthouse and 
file it?” Well, you can’t be too careful, we thought to ourselves. 
Accidents can happen. But when the apparently risk-averse choice 
does little to avert risk and adds costs to the system as well, it is time 
for a change. The stakes, admittedly, are fairly puny. Still, this is an 
everyday irritant that could easily be removed, making the world an 
incrementally better place for legal academics. Let’s make it happen. 
Here’s how.  
Think Before You DNCC. Ask yourself whether you really mean it, 
what you hope to achieve by it, and whether those hopes are well-
founded. If the DNCC gains you nothing, do us all a favor and leave 
it off. We will all be better off for it – including, probably, you. 
Popularize Narrower Alternatives. If a draft still needs a lot of work, 
the phrase “preliminary and incomplete” might be added. It signals 
that there’s a later draft to come, but doesn’t tell readers what to do 
with the draft in their hands. Another alternative is something like 
this: “Draft [date]; contact author at [email] for the most recent ver-
sion.” This works well too, assuming one does eventually generate a 
more recent version. Best of all is to indicate where the paper is 
forthcoming, once one knows. This does a world of good in inducing 
accurate updating without reducing the chance that you’ll be cited at 
all. The use of an “Academic Circulation Encouraged” or “ACE” label 
would also be helpful in clarifying how the work can be used.  
Fight DNCC Abuse. Norm entrepreneurship15 is needed in this area. 
It is probably unnecessary to create “Stop DNCC Abuse” buttons 
                                                                                                 
documents. See Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 2025, 2028 n. 13 (1999) (“Although every page of the EPA’s 
draft guidelines says “Draft – Do Not Cite or Quote,” I have chosen to cite the 
draft guidelines because they are a readily available public document, and because 
they provide the most extensive elaboration to date of the EPA’s position on dis-
counting.”). 
15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 
(1996) (“norm entrepreneurs can alert people to the existence of a shared complaint 
and can suggest a collective solution”). 
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and bumper stickers. But perhaps we should create norms against 
DNCC use where the draft in question is on the internet and appears 
to have been posted there by the author herself. Academics are sen-
sitive creatures and if a few bloggers out there could start a trend of 
mild, good-natured mocking of inappropriately-used DNCC labels, 
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